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Introduction: Desert Research and Technology 
Studies (DRATS) is a multi-year series of NASA tests 
that deploy planetary surface hardware and exercise 
mission and science operations in difficult conditions to 
advance human and robotic exploration capabilities. 
DRATS 2011 (Aug. 30-Sept. 9, 2011) tested strategies 
for human exploration of microgravity targets such as 
near-Earth asteroids (NEAs). Here we report the crew 
perspective on the impact of simulated microgravity 
operations on our capability to conduct field geology. 
Methods: Two significant human exploration 
concepts were tested: (1) the effect of time-delayed 
communications; and (2) multiple combinations of 
hardware and crew assignments. Communication 
between the crew in Arizona and the Mission Control 
Center (MCC) and Science Backroom (SB) (both in 
Houston, TX) was conducted with an artificial 50 s time 
delay to simulate a NEA mission at a distance of ~0.1 
AU from Earth. MCC/SB could speak directly with 
extravehicular (EV) and intravehicular (IV) crew. Two-
way communication via text messaging was available 
between Houston and the IV crew, as was one-way text 
messaging from Houston to the EV crew. 
We report on 3 test conditions, each involving 3 or 
4 human crewmembers and various combinations of 
hardware, including: (1) shirtsleeve backpacks for 
simulated extravehicular activities (EVAs) [1]; (2) two 
Space Exploration Vehicles (SEVs) [2]; and (3) the 
Deep Space Habitat (DSH), a notional laboratory 
module [3]. When tested, the DSH was assumed to be 
orbiting ~1 km from the microgravity target. The crew 
could leave on exploration sorties directly from the 
DSH via EVA, or they could use the SEV to approach 
the target before initiating EVAs. 
We simulated two microgravity EVA modes. One 
assumed the use of a “Super” SAFER (Simplified Aid 
For EVA Rescue), a notional, self-contained propulsive 
backpack system. This assumed capability enabled 
crewmembers to conduct un-tethered EVAs. To 
simulate the propulsive capability of a SSAFER, crew 
translation rates were restricted to <~0.3 m/s. 
Translations were kept (as much as reasonable) to 
straight lines, and all starts, stops, and direction changes 
were recorded to provide 1st-order data on propellant 
usage and impose constraints on propellant loads. 
SSAFER crewmembers were required to anchor to and 
de-anchor from the surface before and after sample 
collection and documentation. This imposed a time 
penalty (~2 min.), and limited the radius of anchored 
operations to ~1 m. 
The second EVA mode involved a notional 
Astronaut Positioning System (APS), a passive 
“robotic” arm mounted to the front of the SEV and 
attached to the EV crewmember. It was assumed that 
the EV crewmember would control their position on the 
APS while the SEV maintained position around the 
target. The APS constrained the operational radius of 
EVA crewmembers to ~4 m, and any motion beyond 
that distance required a translation of the SEV. 
Results: We find that delayed voice 
communications from Houston to the EV crewmembers 
was disruptive to EVAs and risked loss of information 
between Houston and the crew because of the high 
workload EV crewmembers face, especially if 
communications arrive during an EV crewmember’s 
science documentation over the voice-loop. Having at 
least one IV crewmember acting as an intermediary was 
highly valuable for managing delayed communications 
with Houston. The IV crewmember dominantly 
communicated with Houston by two-way text 
messaging, and information for the EV crewmembers 
was relayed by the IV crewmember during moments of 
decreased workload. The IV crewmember was therefore 
a buffer between Houston and the EV crewmembers 
which made the time delay transparent to the EV crew. 
Text messaging was a vital capability as it is inherently 
asynchronous, and, unlike with voice, the flow of 
information in a text conversation is not greatly affected 
by a time delay. When direct voice communication was 
required, Houston relayed a precursor message 
indicating an important voice message would follow in 
30 s, giving the IV and EV crews time to prepare. 
APS and SSAFER had complementary advantages. 
APS enables crews to avoid anchor/de-anchor time 
penalties and was most beneficial to EVAs that 
emphasized sample collection. However, the APS 
limited contextual perspective because it restricted the 
distance that crewmembers could move away from the 
SEV. SSAFER enabled greater mobility and was ideal 
for making contextual observations. However, SSAFER 
imposes anchor/de-anchor penalties. Generally, we 
found that geologic context was best characterized with 
SSAFER, while sample collection and detailed site 
characterization was best conducted with APS. 
Prior to the 2011 test, we hypothesized that a trained 
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geologist would be best used in an EV position. As a 
result of the test, we also identified value in having an 
IV geologist. Sample collection and documentation is 
costly with respect to time [4], and even more so under 
the constraints of microgravity operations. While an EV 
crewmember was documenting samples on EVA, an IV 
geologist in the SEV could be several steps ahead (e.g. 
making independent observations, collecting images, 
choosing the next sample, etc.). An IV geologist, free of 
the burden of performing the EVA, might also be better 
suited to synthesize and communicate science to the SB 
(and/or the DSH), especially since the EV crews were 
never farther than ~25 m from the SEV, and, therefore, 
the IV crew had a clear view of those activities. 
Our experiences show that optimal crew and asset 
allocation depends greatly on the details of each station, 
each requiring different crewmember assignments, 
utilization of geologist expertise, and hardware 
configurations to best achieve the science objectives. 
Therefore, we find great value in preserving the 
capability for the crew (particularly due to the time 
delay) to make real-time crewmember assignments for 
EVAs. This flexibility highlights the advantage of 
including humans in planetary exploration: their ability 
to make real-time observations, interpretations, and 
judgments that factor into each subsequent step of a 
traverse [1,4,5,6]. While rigidly-scripted and highly-
practiced EVAs, such as those on Apollo and ISS, are 
executed to dependable success, such EVAs reduce the 
advantage of using a human over a robot and are less 
scientifically productive [7]. Future exploratory EVAs, 
particularly at distances that impose time-delayed 
communication, will require real-time adjustments to 
EVA plans [6,7] without the luxury of extensive pre-
planning and scripting. 
Finally, we find that the operational and safety 
overhead related to EVAs increases the total cost of 
effectively conducting fieldwork and exercising real-
time exploration decisions. Based on the 2011 test 
compared to previous tests [1,4,5,8,9], we note that this 
overhead is different (and arguably greater) for 
microgravity EVAs than it is for planetary surface 
EVAs (i.e. Moon or Mars). We suggest that, while 
humans may be more effective science explorers than 
remotely-operated robots, the operational overhead 
imposed by EVAs may offset this benefit in the case of 
microgravity targets. However, we still find a 
compelling scientific advantage for including humans, 
as opposed to robots alone, in lunar- or Mars-like 
gravity environments. 
Conclusions & Recommendations: The 
technologies required to conduct field geology on a 
microgravity target are in development. As such, we 
recommend capabilities that should be preserved within 
this developing exploration architecture. The 
complementary nature of SSAFER and APS highlights 
the importance of preserving both mobility, for site 
characterization, and anchoring capabilities, for sample 
collection. This may require the continued development 
of both APS- and SSAFER-like hardware, or dictate the 
necessary capabilities for new EVA technologies. 
The role of an IV crewmember, as a 
communications intermediary as well as offering 
geologic expertise when necessary, is highly important. 
However we do not feel that this role was adequately 
tested during 2011 with respect to the number of IV 
crew, their optimal location (DSH and/or SEV), or their 
specific roles. We recommend future tests focus on how 
best to use this position. We also note that the workload 
of precision station-keeping operations around a NEA 
target may require a dedicated pilot, so an additional IV 
crewmember may be required. 
Future testing might focus on the decision-making 
process between the crew and MCC/SB for real-time 
crew assignments at a station. It is clear that crew 
autonomy becomes increasingly important as 
communications time delays increase. This requires a 
high level of training for all crewmembers, and the 
inclusion of trained specialists (e.g., professional 
geologists) to lead science activities onsite. All 
crewmembers should be cross-trained as much as is 
practical. Furthermore, science team feedback to the 
crew is extremely important. The crew benefit greatly 
from inclusion in the science discussion and from a 
basic evaluation of data quality (observations, images, 
etc.) as the data is being collected or soon thereafter. 
Comparison with previous DRATS tests indicates 
that the additional operational overhead of exploring an 
extreme microgravity target such as a NEA reduces the 
scientific advantage of using a human over a robot 
compared to operations on a planetary surface such as 
the Moon or Mars. As such, the true science value of 
sending a human to a microgravity target must be 
weighed against the cost of doing so. 
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